Wednesday – M.A. in Philosophy (Focus: Theoretical Philosophy)

30057 Memory, identity, and digital technologies (Fanti Rovetta)
10:00 am - 12:00 pm
This course examines how 4E (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended) approaches to cognition have challenged internalist views of memory and identity, and how digital technologies (social media, virtual reality, AI) bear on these debates. Students will acquire the conceptual tools to think about such technologies from the vantage point of contemporary philosophy of mind. In the first part, you will be introduced to 4E approaches and their development focusing on the issue of whether cognitive processes are confined to the brain or constitutively involve the body and the environment. We will then turn to digital technologies as a testing ground for these views: can a smartphone or a search engine literally be part of our cognitive processes, and under what conditions does external scaffolding count as genuine extension rather than mere causal influence? In the second part, we will apply these ideas to investigate the relation between new technologies, memory, and selfhood. We will address questions such as: what becomes of memory and identity in digital environments? How do social media profiles, virtual avatars, and algorithmic recommendation systems shape who we take ourselves to be? Can autobiographical memory and narrative identity be extended by digital technologies? What survives us in our digital remains? Literature: The reading list will be provided on Moodle before the start of the course. Language of Instruction: English. Exam: Essay.

030114 “I, Me, and Mine”: The Self from Kant to Freud, Wittgenstein, and Sartre (Vernazzani)
10:00 am - 12:00 pm
What is self-consciousness, and in what ways does it relate to our use, in language and in thought, of the first person pronoun ‘I’? This question, first raised by Kant in his first Critique, is at the core of Béatrice Longuenesse’s last book I, Me and Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again (OUP, 2017). In this ambitious work, Longuenesse explores recent developments in the philosophy of self-consciousness, starting from Wittgenstein’s famous distinction between ‘I’ as an object and ‘I’ as a subject, which has largely dominated analytical philosophy in the last decades, to Gareth Evans’s and Jean-Paul Sartre’s accounts of bodily self-consciousness. Longuenesse argues for a reassessment of Kant’s distinction between consciousness of one’s own body and consciousness of mental unity, i.e. a specific organization of mental events. Focusing on the latter, Longuenesse argues that the most promising account of mental unity preserving the Kantian insights can be found in Freud’s theory of the “ego,” an internal organization of mental events according to the “reality principle” and governed by elementary logical rules that allow us to acquire a reliable representation of the world.

030103 Game Theory for Philosophy (Michelini)
10:00 am - 12:00 pm
This course explores the fascinating intersection of game theory and philosophy, where strategic thinking meets ethical dilemmas, scientific inquiry, and social dynamics. Game theory, extensively developed over recent decades, has become a powerful tool for addressing philosophical challenges, from collective action to the foundations of rationality. In this course, you'll gain foundational game-theoretic tools to analyze a range of philosophical problems. We'll begin with accessible formal concepts, such as normal games, bargaining games, and evolutionary games, examining classic scenarios like the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt. In the second part, we'll explore how these tools illuminate pressing philosophical questions: What insights can game theory provide about scientific collaboration and epistemic games? How does evolutionary game theory explain the emergence of trust and cooperation? Designed for students with no prior mathematical background, this course aims both at providing students with technical tools to handle game theoretical problems and to present how to use them to deal with philosophical problems.

030117 Introduction to Pragmatics in Philosophy and Linguistics (Spychalska)
10:00 am - 2:00 pm
This course introduces basic notions and concepts in pragmatics such as implicatures, presuppositions, speech acts, deixis. We will read chapters from Levison "Pragmatics" and Huang "Pragmatics" as well as selected articles.Students will be expected to give a presentation in English. Requirements: Active participation and a presentation in class

000000 Life in Space (Boge)
10:00 am - 12:00 pm
Are we alone in the universe? This question is as multifaceted as are the lines of potential evidence for living beings on other planets. For instance, can we detect ‘biosignatures’ on extrasolar planets (Kinney & Kempes, 2022), and how should we even define them (Malaterre et al., 2023)? How credible and safe are results in “astrobiology” in general (Vickers et al., 2023; Jeancolas et al., 2024)? Are there evolutionary arguments that life should be expected to be scattered across distant galaxies (Hermida, 2022), and how do we determine how life originates at all (Malaterre et al., 2022)? Is there solid evidence of artefacts from other civilizations crossing our solar system (Loeb, 2022; Cowie, 2023; Matarese, 2022)? Or is it even reasonable to believe that there are living beings from other planets here on earth (Lane, 2025)? Furthermore, if we do detect life in space, how should we interact with it (Peters, 2018; Baum, 2016)?nn References (incomplete):nn • Baum, S. D. (2016). The ethics of outer space: a consequentialist perspective, in James S.J. Schwartz & Tony Milligan (eds.), The ethics of space exploration, 109-123. Springer.n • Cowie, C. (2023). Arguing about extraterrestrial intelligence. The Philosophical Quarterly, 73(1), 64-83.n • Hermida, M. (2022). Natural Selection of Independently Originated Life Clades. Philosophy of Science, 89(3), 454-470.n • Jeancolas, C., Gillen, C., McMahon, S., Ward, M., & Vickers, P. J. (2024). Breakthrough results in astrobiology: is ‘high risk’research needed?. International Journal of Astrobiology, 23, e1.n • Kinney, D. & Kempes, C. (2022). Epistemology and anomaly detection in astrobiology. Biology & Philosophy 37, 22. Lane, W. C. (2025). The extraterrestrial hypothesis: an epistemological case for removing the taboo. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 15(1), 1-34.n • Loeb, A. (2022). On the possibility of an artificial origin for ‘Oumuamua. Astrobiology, 22(12), 1392-1399.n • Malaterre, C., Jeancolas, C., & Nghe, P. (2022). The origin of life: what is the question?. Astrobiology, 22(7), 851-862.n • Malaterre, C., et al. (2023). Is there such a thing as a biosignature? Astrobiology, 23(11), 1213-1227.n • Matarese, V. (2022). ‘Oumuamua and meta-empirical confirmation. Foundations of Physics, 52(4), 83.n • Peters, T. (2018). Toward a Galactic Common Good: Space Exploration Ethics. In: Boonin, D. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. n • Vickers, P., Cowie, C., Dick, S. J., Gillen, C., Jeancolas, C., Rothschild, L. J., & McMahon, S. (2023). Confidence of life detection: The problem of unconceived alternatives. Astrobiology, 23(11), 1202-1212.n

000000 Selective Scientific Realism (Boge/Stoll)
10:00 am - 12:00 pm
The device you are reading this on would not have been possible without prior scientific theorizing. Like pretty much any other technological device, it is hence a clear success of science – as are weather forecasts, predictions of black holes and gravitational waves, or the anticipation of anthropogenic climate change. In the 1970s, philosopher Hilary Putnam thus called scientific realism 'the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle'. Scientific realism is a philosophical stance towards science, usually interpreted in terms of (i) the metaphysical commitment that there is, indeed, a mind-independent reality out there to be discovered, (ii) the semantic commitment that scientific theories, claims and hypotheses are capable of being literally true (i.e., not just metaphors that need interpretation, or prescriptions for doing something) and (iii) the epistemic claim that the best theories, claims and hypotheses are in fact at least approximately true of that mind-independent reality. On the other hand, as Larry Laudan and others before him have pointed out, the history of science contains a load of then-successful but now-rejected theories. How can we reconcile this with the evident, spectacular successes of science, such as its enabling feats of engineering or allowing the prediction of hitherto unknown phenomena? Selective scientific realism, which broadly says that only some parts of theories, claims or hypotheses need to be true to explain scientific success, provides an answer to this struggle. The seminar will discuss some classic forms of selective realism, classic approaches to developing and justifying it, as well as new vistas on its intricacies and problems. Students taking the course should be willing to engage with rigorous arguments and examples from the natural sciences. Detailed familiarity with e.g. mathematics or physics is not required.

30017 Philosophical theories of the self (Fanti Rovetta)
10:00 am - 12:00 pm
What is, if anything, the self? In this seminar, we will investigate competing attempts to answer this question in contemporary debates. We will consider whether the solution is to be found in memory and the continuity of consciousness, in the stories we can tell others and ourselves about our own lives, in being a biological organism, or in the pre-reflective awareness accompanying experience. We will also consider arguments that the self is incompatible with a scientific worldview and, therefore, there is no such thing as the self. Conversely, we will look at arguments for pluralism, according to which no single theory is uniquely correct because the right approach is the integration of various proposals. Lastly, we will consider exotic (i.e., non-mainstream) theories of the self, such as the extended self view. Literature: The reading list will be provided on Moodle before the start of the course. Language of Instruction: English. Office hours: please contact me via email to request a meeting.

30065 Introduction to History and Philosophy of the Life and Health Sciences (Petino Zappala)
12:00 pm - 2:00 pm
tba

000000 Knowledge Across Cultures and Languages (Wimmer)
12:00 pm - 2:00 pm
Words for knowledge exist, and are widely used, in all known natural languages. But do people across the world think of knowledge the same way or are there important differences? The aim of this course is to look at how diverse cultural and linguistic communities think of knowledge. This will allow us to appreciate how different in some ways, but also similar in others, their conceptions are. The seminar will begin by covering work in experimental philosophy that highlights cultural similarities and differences in when humans intuitively say of others that they know. We then draw on anthropological work to learn about knowledge in the Ifa religious system (in West Africa) and amongst speakers of Ende (in Eastern Indonesia). Turning to differences in how words for knowledge are realized in the world's languages, we will compare English and German to a number of other languages, including, among others, Turkish and Korean. This part of the course will also involve a guest lecture by a linguist from Sweden, who is a world-leading expert on how human languages represent knowledge. The seminar will be held in English. However, exams and questions may also be in German. In addition to the content-related learning goals, the seminar will also be about practising reading and discussing in English. Students who find their English to be somewhat ‘rusty’ are very welcome. The course will be based on individual articles and book chapters by a number of authors. All texts will be accessible via moodle.

000000 Concepts: (What) Are They? (What) Should They Be? (Thienenkamp)
12:00 pm - 2:00 pm
Concepts are sometimes thought of by philosophers as the „building blocks of thought.“ But what exactly are concepts? While some think of them as mental representations, others think of them as, for instance, abilities. The earlier sessions of this seminar will cover some of these metaphysical debates. Furthermore, some philosophers, so-called „conceptual engineers,“ argue that we should seek to improve (at least some) concepts. Such conceptual changes can have very real epistemic and sociopolitical stakes: Was it a good thing that our concept „planet“ changed in such a way as to no longer include Pluto? Should our concept „man“ change in such a way as to include transgender men (and vice versa for transgender women)? The remaining sessions of this seminar will focus on various (more „applied“ or „practical“) debates from the field of conceptual engineering.
alexander.hoelken@rub.de

000000 The edge of sentience: humans, other animals, and AI (Crone)
12:00 pm - 2:00 pm
Humans are sentient beings: for example, they have the capacity to have subjective experiences and feelings. But is there sentience across different species, including non-human animals, and in AI systems? And how do we need to understand “sentience” to address these questions? In the seminar, we will read and discuss Jonathan Birch’s recent book The edge of sentience. Birch argues that understanding sentience is crucial for ethical considerations in how we treat other beings, whether they are non-human animals or AI systems. There will be a workshop with Jonathan Birch at the University of Bochum on 12-13 June. Our seminar will attend this workshop, providing an opportunity to interact directly with Birch and engage in discussions about sentience and ethics.nn Literatur:n Birch, Jonathan (2024) The edge of sentience: humans, other animals, and AI, OUP (open access)
alexander.hoelken@rub.de

30029 Aktuelle Themen in der Philosophie der Sprache und Kognition/Topics in the Philosophy of Language and Cognition (Werning)
12:00 pm - 2:00 pm
In the seminar, we will discuss a selection of up-to-date topics in the philosophy of language and cognition. The seminar provides an opportunity for BA, MA, and PhD students to present their own thesis projects and receive feedback. It addresses students who have a particular interest in theoretical and experiment studies on the comprehension of language and its interaction with cognition. To earn credits, students are expected to do a presentation. To earn up to 6CPs, students can choose between writing a term paper and taking the opportunity to do an internship in our EEG lab plus protocol. The topics we will discuss, among others, are: · The influence of linguistic context on lexical meaning - theory and experiments · Implicatures, presuppositions, co-suppositions and how to test them in experiments · The role of co-speech gestures in communication - theory and experiments · The evaluation of large language models relative to human language comprehension using EEG and other methods Even though, the language of most papers and presentations will be in English, contributions to discussions can also be made in German. Literature · Werning, M., Hinzen, W., & Machery, E. (Eds.). (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199541072.001.0001 · Schlenker, P. (2022). What it all means: Semantics for (almost) everything. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12128.001.0001 · Schlenker, P. (2022). What it all means: Semantics for (almost) everything. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12128.001.0001

030094 Gödel: The Unprovability of the Consistency of Arithmetic (Kürbis, Skurt)
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem proved that if arithmetic is (omega) consistent, then it is not negation complete, that is, there is a sentence such that neither it nor its negation is provable in arithmetic. Gödel established this result by exhibiting a sentence of arithmetic, the so-called Gödel sentence, that is equivalent to the statement of its own unprovability in arithmetic. The second incompleteness theorem showed that if arithmetic is consistent, then it cannot prove the statement that expresses the consistency of arithmetic. This course is an introduction to all formal aspects of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. We will begin with a recapitulation of fundamental results about first order logic, such as its completeness and the Löwenheim Skolem Theorem, and proceed to first order theories, in particular a fragment of number theory. Gödel’s method of the arithmetisation of syntax and its application to the formalisation of proofs in arithmetic will be presented in detail. We will then be ready to prove Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. Afterwards we will consider the resources needed to prove the second incompleteness theorem. There will also be time to discuss the philosophical importance of Gödel’s results. | | | Literature: George Boolos: The Logic of Provability (Cambridge University Press 1993) Herbert B. Enderton: A Mathematical Introduction to Logic, 2nd edition (San Diego: Harcourt 2001) Eliot Mendelson: An Introduction to Mathematical Logic, 6th edition (Boca Raton: CRC Press 2015)

30005 Formal Logic (Skurt)
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
The lecture offers a thorough treatment of intuitionistic logic, including proofs of soundness, completeness, and other fundamental model- and proof theoretic properties, such as the disjunction and existence property in the intuitionistic case. In addition, the course gives an overview of basic non-classical logics, such as first-degree entailment logic. CP can be earned by a graded written exam.

30050 What is Imagination? – Topics in the Philosophy of Imagination (Wolf)
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
The ability to imagine - that is to go beyond the real - is a fascinating aspect of human cognition. You can be sat in a lecture while at the same time imagining being on a tropical island beach. Or you might stand in your living room, imagining what the room would look like if painted in a different colour. Similarly, a child can pretend to be in hot pursuit of a criminal with an imaginary friend, while knowing that both the criminal and the imaginary friend are not real. But how does imagination work? The topic of imagination has been a very active area of research in recent philosophy of mind, with considerable debate regarding the question of what imagination is, the processes it involves and the functions it might serve. Based on recent texts from the philosophy of imagination we will explore and discuss 1) what imagination is; 2) how it relates to other mental phenomena like beliefs, desires or mental imagery and 3) explore what some of the functions of imagination might be (e.g. the role that imagination can play for gaining new knowledge or for creative thinking). Texts for the seminar will be made available via Moodle. Examination: written assignment or oral exam

030111 Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: Concepts, Computation, & Connectionism (Werning)
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
This seminar delves into the philosophical questions surrounding Artificial Intelligence (AI), with a focus on the fundamental concepts it employs, the computational nature of intelligence, and the role of connectionism in AI development. Key questions explored: What is intelligence? Can it be replicated in machines? What is the nature of computation? How is it related to thought and reasoning? Do AI systems possess concepts. Do they have cognition? What are the philosophical implications of symbolic and connectionist approaches to AI? Can AI achieve consciousness, free will, and true understanding? What are the ethical and societal implications of advanced AI? Through critical discussions, readings, and presentations, you will engage with: Classical philosophers like Turing, Fodor, Searle Contemporary thinkers in AI and cognitive science Symbolic AI: Knowledge representation, reasoning systems, and compositionality Connectionist AI: Artificial neural networks, deep learning, and large language models Philosophical debates on consciousness, intentionality, and the mind-body problem Aside from active participation, participants will be expected to give a presentation in English. Assistance regarding the English language will be provided.

030086 Gentzen: The Provability of the Consistency of Arithmetic (Seminar) (Kürbis, Kurt)
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
In 1936 Gentzen published the first consistency proof of Peano Arithmetic. To be precise, Gentzen proved the consistency of Peano arithmetic formalised in a version of his sequent calculus. Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem shows that the consistency of Peano Arithmetic cannot be proved within Peano arithmetic, if it is consistent. Consequently, Gentzen’s proof must make use of methods that do not form part of Peano arithmetic. Gentzen used transfinite induction over the complexity of proofs up to the ordinal ??0. This raises the philosophical question whether the method of proof can be regarded as finitary, as demanded by Hilbert’s Programme. Besides the proof, Gentzen’s article also contains philosophical considerations concerning this question. We’ll go through the entirety of Gentzen’s article. Time permitting, we also look at Hilbert and Bernays’ assessment of Gentzen’s proof in relation to Hilbert’s Programme.

030095 Andy Clark, “The Experience Machine: How Our Minds Predict and Shape Reality” (Wiese)
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
About a decade ago, Andy Clark published an influential paper in which he argued for an approach to understanding the mind that he called “predictive processing” (Clark, 2013). According to predictive processing, the brain uses a probabilistic model of its environment to make predictions about sensory signals and their hidden causes. Predictive processing does not constitute a novel approach to studying the mind, but seeks to unify many existing approaches under a single principle: prediction error minimization. In this seminar, we will read and discuss Clark’s most recent book, The Experience Machine. While Clark’s earlier (2016) book on predictive processing, Surfing Uncertainty, mostly addressed cognition and action, Clark (2023) also considers conscious experience. If possible, it is recommended that you purchase a copy of the book (Clark, 2023).

030106 Compositionality in Language, Mind, and Brain (Werning)
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
Compositionality is a key concept in linguistics, the philosophy of mind and language, and throughout the cognitive sciences. Understanding how it works is a central element of syntactic and semantic analysis, and a challenge for models of cognition. In this seminar, we will read papers on the state of the art in all aspects of the subject from every relevant field. They reveal the connections in different lines of research, and highlight its most challenging problems and opportunities. The force and justification of compositionality have long been contentious. First proposed by Frege as the notion that the meaning of an expression is syntax-dependently determined by the meaning of its parts, it has since been deployed as a constraint on the relation between theories of syntax and semantics, as a means of analysis, and, more recently, as underlying the structures of representational systems such as mental concepts, computer programs and neural architectures. This seminar explores these and many other dimensions of one of the most exciting fields in the study of language and cognition. Aside from active participation, participants will be expected to give a presentation in English. Assistance regarding the English language will be provided.

030094 Gödel: The Unprovability of the Consistency of Arithmetic (Kürbis)
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem proved that if arithmetic is (omega) consistent, then it is not negation complete, that is, there is a sentence such that neither it nor its negation is provable in arithmetic. Gödel established this result by exhibiting a sentence of arithmetic, the so-called Gödel sentence, that is equivalent to the statement of its own unprovability in arithmetic. The second incompleteness theorem showed that if arithmetic is consistent, then it cannot prove the statement that expresses the consistency of arithmetic. This course is an introduction to all formal aspects of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. We will begin with a recapitulation of fundamental results about first order logic, such as its completeness and the Löwenheim Skolem Theorem, and proceed to first order theories, in particular a fragment of number theory. Gödel’s method of the arithmetisation of syntax and its application to the formalisation of proofs in arithmetic will be presented in detail. We will then be ready to prove Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. Afterwards we will consider the resources needed to prove the second incompleteness theorem. There will also be time to discuss the philosophical importance of Gödel’s results.

030107 Embodied Cognition: Past, Present, and Future (Venter, Wolf)
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
This seminar provides an in-depth exploration of embodied cognition, a cornerstone concept in cognitive science that posits the body as integral to shaping the mind. We will trace its historical roots and evolution, critically examine empirical evidence, and assess the concept's implications across traditional philosophical domains and emerging cognitive sciences. The course includes a review of seminal works by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), and other pioneers, along with a thorough analysis of how sensory and motor systems influence cognitive functions. We'll delve into embodied cognition's application in language processing, problem-solving, and memory, and discuss its potential challenges to conventional cognitive science paradigms. Additionally, we'll explore its impact on psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and robotics, considering future research trends and the implications of its technological applications.

030093 Explainable Artificial Intelligence (Wiese)
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
This course deals with philosophical issues surrounding the transparency and accountability of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Traditional AI is typically transparent; its algorithms are programmed to follow specific strategies, making their performance understandable to the programmers. In contrast, contemporary AI, often based on machine learning and large datasets, operates in a more opaque manner. The complexity of these systems means that while programmers understand how the algorithms work, they often cannot fully explain how an AI achieves successful outcomes or cannot predict the conditions under which it might fail. Put differently, there is – at least in many contexts – a trade-off between accuracy and interpretability. Explainable AI (XAI) aims to alleviate this problem by providing insights into the functioning of current AI systems. This includes understanding successes and failures of AIs, which is crucial to assessing their reliability and trustworthiness. However, the concepts of explainable, interpretable, and trustworthy AI are themselves philosophically complex and ambiguous. This seminar offers an overview of philosophical challenges related to XAI. It provides some insights into contemporary approaches to enhancing AI transparency, interpretability, and trustworthiness, fostering a critical understanding of these efforts. As a result, students will be able to critically discuss current approaches in AI development, as well as in AI ethics and governance.

030116 The experimental investigation of language-related phenomena in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science: behavioral, EEG and other methods (Spychalska)
2:00 pm - 6:00 pm
This course introduces EEG research in the area of philosophy of language, linguistics and cognitive science, especially focusing on semantics and pragmatics. It will include overview lectures of the method, in particular aspects such as experimental design, measurement, ERP components, basis principles of analysis and results interpretation. The course will involve team project, where students will conceptualize their own study based on provided literature. Part of the course will involve consultation team-instructor meetings (also via zoom) aimed at discussing and improving the team projects. Final projects will be presented and discussed together. Requirements: Presentation and a team project

30092 Concepts (Orlandi)
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
This class is an examination of concepts in contemporary (western) philosophy of mind and in cognitive science. Concepts are generally understood as explanatory posits that are introduced to explain a number of human capacities, such as thinking, reasoning and categorizing. Aside from this general consensus, however, there is little agreement as to what concepts are. We will look at leading theories of concepts and at their problems. Then we will look at recent work on the acquisition of concepts. This is a fairly advanced course in philosophy of mind designed for graduate students but recommended also to advanced undergraduates who are interested in cognitive science. The class does not require prior knowledge of philosophy of mind, but it does require an understanding of what arguments are and of how they should be reconstructed and evaluated. It also requires knowledge of how philosophy papers should be read and written. A prior introductory logic class or a prior writing- intensive philosophy class is strongly recommended.

30048 Ethics of Large Language Models (Weber-Guskar)
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
This course is taught en bloc. For dates and times, please see the entry on eCampus. This advanced seminar examines some philosophical and ethical issues of current human interaction with large language models. We begin with deceptively simple questions: can such systems genuinely speak, or do they merely simulate linguistic agency? As we ourselves do obviously talk to them: with whom, if anyone, are we in dialogue when we converse with them? From there we investigate questions concerning morality and ethics: What kinds of moral competencies, should and could these systems possess? Can morality be operationalized in code, and if so, through which technical and conceptual architectures? Furthermore, the seminar addresses the possibility of friendship, intimacy, and even love with artificial interlocutors. Are such relations coherent, illusory, or potentially transformative forms of sociality? Finally, we assess opportunities and risks: personal support and empowerment, epistemic access, but also dependency, manipulation and shifts in human self-understanding that might affect not only our personal but also political lives. The literature will be provided via Moodle at the beginning of the semester. Exams: Kleine Leistung": Regular short writing assignments. Große Leistung": Term paper or oral exam

30006 Formal Logic (Exercises) (Skurt)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
The exercises accompanying the lecture Formal Logic contribute to the participants' confidence in the application of methods, techniques, and procedures of formal logic. CP can be earned by active participation and regular handed in exercise sheets.

030120 Colloquium: Philosophy of Language, Logic, and Information (Liefke, Rami)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
This colloquium serves the discussion of current topics at the semantic interface of logic, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of information. The colloquium will combine talks by international experts with presentations of local researchers and (PhD/MA) students. Students will be given the opportunity to present their (ongoing) work in English. A detailed schedule will be available by end-March at https://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/phil-inf/colloquium/index.html.en.

30090 Empirical Methods in Semantics and Pragmatics (Spychalska)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
tba

30084 Philosophy of Mind Wandering (Li)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
Everyone's mind wanders. Yet we know surprisingly little about mind wandering. Although there have long been scattered philosophical reflections on distraction, reverie, and the stream of consciousness, mind wandering has only recently become a focus of systematic philosophical and scientific research. Psychological studies estimate that it occupies roughly one-third to one-half of waking life, so understanding mind wandering is essential to understanding the human mind. This seminar examines mind wandering from an interdisciplinary perspective. Topics include the current state of psychological and neuroscientific research; the concept and definition of mind wandering; the potential mechanisms underlying it, especially the role of cognitive control; whether and in what sense mind wandering can be agential, and how it relates to our mental autonomy; and its possible functions and value. Literature: Christoff, K., Irving, Z. C., Fox, K. C. R., Spreng, R. N., & Andrews-Hanna, J. R. (2016). Mind-wandering as spontaneous thought: A dynamic framework. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 17(11), 718-731. Irving, Z. C., & Thompson, E. (2018). The philosophy of mind-wandering. In K. C. R. Fox and K. Christoff (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of spontaneous thought: Mind-wandering, creativity, and dreaming (pp. 87-96). Oxford University Press. Metzinger, T. (2013). The myth of cognitive agency: Subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, Article 931. Seli, P., Kane, M. J., Smallwood, J., Schacter, D. L., Maillet, D., Schooler, J. W., & Smilek, D. (2018). Mind-wandering as a natural kind: A family-resemblances view. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 22(6), 479-490. Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2015). The science of mind wandering: Empirically navigating the stream of consciousness. Annual Review of Psychology, 66, 487-518.

30111 Kolloquium zur Antiken Philosophie (Sattler)
4:00 pm - 6:30 pm
Dieses Kolloquium ist für alle Studentinnen und Studenten gedacht, die an einer Abschlussarbeit oder einer größeren Arbeit sitzen, die entweder in den Bereich der antiken Philosophie fällt oder Bezüge zur antiken Philosophie aufweist. Es ist als freundliches Forum gedacht, wo diese Arbeiten vorgestellt werden können und lädt zudem Vortragende von auswärts ein. Das Kolloquium kann auch als Lesegruppe und Diskussionsforum für die Lektüre von neuerschienenen Texten zur antiken Philosophie dienen. Kleine Studienleistung: Seminarpräsentation Sprechstunde nach Vereinbarung

030120 Topics in Philosophy of Language, Logic, and Information: Attitudes and their objects (Liefke, Rami)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
Assume that Gregor imagines turning into a beetle. Intuitively, this is different both from Gregor imagining a beetle and from Gregor imagining (turning into) a vermin (even if all beetles are vermin). This seminar introduces current philosophical research on mental states like imagination and their metaphysical objects (e.g. possibilities, fictional entities). To facilitate access to this area, the seminar will combine topical introductions (by Kristina Liefke and Dolf Rami) with presentations by well-known researchers (e.g. Alex Grzankowski, Justin D'Ambrosio, Friederike Moltmann). Students will have the opportunity to earn a ‘kleine Studienleistung’ [3 CPs] (by writing a summary of one of the expert presentations, or by giving an in-class talk) and a ‘große Studienleistung’ [6 CPs] (by additionally writing a research paper).

030114 Introduction to Formal Epistemology (Wang/Straßer)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
Formal epistemology aims to address both old and new epistemological problems using mathematical methods. This introductory-level course will cover selected topics in formal epistemology. The main focus will be on different types of formal representation models of qualitative and quantitative beliefs and their rational relations. Specifically, the course will explore basic epistemic and doxastic logic, AGM belief revision theory, the Dutch book argument, epistemic decision theory, and the Lottery paradox. Moreover, this course aims to balance breadth and depth of understanding. Students will learn how to read formal theorems and proofs and play with mathematical concepts. A familiarity with first-order logic is a prerequisite. Some knowledge of basic set theory and probability calculus would be beneficial, though these will be taught during class. The course will be conducted in English. In principle, there will be no required readings. I will give lectures on important concepts and theorems with my lecture notes referencing the following literature.

030102 Topics in Philosophy of Language, Logic and Information: Fictional Entities (Liefke, Rami)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm

030126 Kolloquium zur Antiken Philosophie (Sattler)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
Dieses Kolloquium ist für alle Studenten gedacht, die an einer Abschlussarbeit oder einer größeren Arbeit sitzen, die entweder in den Bereich der antiken Philosophie fällt oder Bezüge zur antiken Philosophie aufweist. Es ist als freundliches Forum gedacht, wo diese Arbeiten vorgestellt werden können und lädt zudem Vortragende von auswärts ein. Das Kolloquium kann auch als Lesegruppe und Diskussionsforum für die Lektüre von neuerschienenen Texten zur antiken Philosophie dienen.

000000 Philosophy in Dialogue: Mind and World (Martina)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
What is knowledge and why is it important? Do our senses give knowledge of the world? Can we really know anything at all? What is the role of arguments, and what does it mean to beg the question in an argument? What is the difference between dreaming and perceiving? Do animals have minds and conscious experiences? And how could we know this? What about plants? Are colours real? What sort of things exist? Do things like holes and shadows really exist? If two things share all of their properties, are they the same thing? This course will explore some central questions in metaphysics and epistemology through the writings of philosophers from a range of traditions and times, such as Plato, Margaret Cavendish, Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī and Abū ʿAlī Miskawayh, George Berkeley, Gongsun Longzi, Cicero, Zhuangzi, Richard Robinson, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Jonathan Birch, and Max Block. What is distinctive about this course is that we will focus on philosophical dialogues (written texts in a dialogue form). These genuine or fictional philosophical debates amongst characters with different views and insights will give us an engaging way of approaching philosophical argument. During the seminar, you will develop your reading and interpretative skills, gain an understanding of central questions in metaphysics and epistemology from a historical and global perspective, and improve your argumentation, cooperative discussion skills and critical thinking. The assignments will include written answers to comprehension questions on the readings, group work, and a presentation in which you will read and comment on a fragment of a dialogue.
alexander.hoelken@rub.de

30096 Relational semantics 101 (Drobyshevich)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
tba

30123 Topics in the Philosophy of Language, Logic and Information: Imagination (Liefke / Rami)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
Representations play an important role in semantics and the philosophy of language. This research seminar gives an introduction to current work on representations, focusing on linguistic, pictorial, and mental representations as well as on the history of (philosophical work on) representations. Discussion will investigate what properties are shared by all representations (expectedly: reference and truth/accuracy, among other), whether all representations are conceptual, and whether representations must have constituent parts. The seminar will combine introductions to various aspects of representations (by Kristina Liefke and Dolf Rami) with talks by international experts. Students will have the opportunity to earn a 'kleine Studienleistung' [3 CPs] (by writing a summary of one of the expert talks, or by giving an in-class presentation) and a 'große Studienleistung' [6 CPs] (by additionally writing a research paper).

030106 Pleasure, Pain, and Beyond: Valence as a scientific concept (Dolega)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
This seminar explores the concept of valence, a central but contested notion across affective science, psychology of emotion, and philosophy of mind. We will examine how valence functions in psychological models of affect as the dimension that structures experiences of pleasure and displeasure, motivates attraction and aversion, and interacts with other dimensions of affect, like arousal. From a philosophical perspective, we will consider whether valence is best understood as either an evaluative or attitudinal property, a functional role, or something else entirely, as well as how it shapes debates about the nature of emotions, the structure of phenomenal experience, and the explanation of motivation. Readings will span empirical work in affective science, contemporary theories of emotion, and philosophical accounts of perceptual and affective experience, with an eye to assessing whether a unified account of valence is possible or whether its usage fragments across disciplines. Assessment will be based on short weekly reflections critical of primary texts and a research paper exploring a contested issue surrounding valence. Literatur: Full list of readings will be made available via Moodle. Below are exemplars of introductory readings: Barlassina, L. (2020). Valence: A reflection. Emotion Researcher: ISRE's Sourcebook for Research on Emotion and Affect. https://philarchive.org/rec/BARVAR-3 Feldman Barret, L. (2006). Valence is a basic building block of emotional life. Journal of Research in Personality, 40(1), 35-55. http://ivizlab.sfu.ca/arya/Papers/Others/Emotions/Valence.pdf
alexander.hoelken@rub.de

30062 Topics in the Philosophy of Language, Logic and Information: (Non)Existence (Rami / Liefke)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
tba

30065 Minds without Mirrors – Richard Rorty’s “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Dolega)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
tba

30093 Conceptual Engineering (Orlandi)
4:00 pm - 6:00 pm
Nico Orlandi (UC Santa Cruz, DAAD Gastprofessur Philosophy of Cognitive Science) Conceptual engineering is usually understood as the design, implementation, and evaluation of concepts in projects that aim to ameliorate our understanding of the social and political world. But what are concepts such that conceptual engineering would even be possible? And is conceptual engineering something we should want to do (and why)? This seminar aims to address these questions by reading literature in western analytic philosophy starting from the work of feminist philosopher Sally Haslanger. Haslanger is often credited with introducing the idea of 'ameliorative' projects that, rather than simply describing the concepts we have, strive to design our concepts in ways that meet our social and political goals. We will look at critical reactions to this idea, as well as at ways of developing it.

30109 Kolloquium zur antiken Philosophie (Sattler)
4:00 pm - 6:30 pm
This course is taught en bloc. For dates and times, please see the entry on eCampus. Dieses Kolloquium ist für alle Studenten gedacht, die an einer Abschlussarbeit oder einer größeren Arbeit sitzen, die entweder in den Bereich der antiken Philosophie fällt oder Bezüge zur antiken Philosophie aufweist. Es ist als freundliches Forum gedacht, wo diese Arbeiten vorgestellt werden können und lädt zudem Vortragende von auswärts ein. Das Kolloquium kann auch als Lesegruppe und Diskussionsforum für die Lektüre von neuerschienenen Texten zur antiken Philosophie dienen.

030128 EXTRA Research Colloquium “Metaphilosophy, Experimental Philosophy, and Argumentation Theory” (Horvath)
4:30 pm - 6:00 pm
In this colloquium in seminar-style, we will discuss current topics from argumentation theory, epistemology, experimental philosophy, and metaphilosophy, broadly construed. The colloquium will also host a number of talks by external guests, many of which are leading experts in their field. Students at the advanced bachelor, master, or doctoral level are especially welcome in the colloquium, and they can also acquire the normal range of credit points. Moreover, student participants will have the option of presenting their own work, e.g., related to their thesis, in English.

030128 EXTRA Research Colloquium “Metaphilosophy, Experimental Philosophy, and Argumentation Theory” (Horvath)
4:30 pm - 6:00 pm
In this colloquium in seminar-style, we will discuss current topics from argumentation theory, epistemology, experimental philosophy, and metaphilosophy, broadly construed. The colloquium will also host a number of talks by external guests, many of which are leading experts in their field. Advanced bachelor students, master students, and doctoral students are especially welcome in the colloquium, in which they can also acquire the normal range of credit points. Moreover, student participants can make suggestions for suitable readings to be discussed in the colloquium, and they will have the option of presenting their work, for example, related to their thesis, in English.

030125 Research Colloquium: Rationality and Cognition (Brössel)
5:00 pm - 7:00 pm
In this seminar, we study research articles (some of which will be work-in-progress) from the intersection of normative epistemology and descriptive epistemology (i.e., psychology and cognitive science). We investigate formal models of perception, rational reasoning, and rational action. Students at the master's or doctoral level will be given the opportunity to present their research in English.

30110 Representations in Minds, Brains & AI (Dolega / Schlicht)
6:00 pm - 8:00 pm
Mental Representations are the central theoretical posit in cognitive science and psychology. On the one hand, we attribute beliefs and desires as well as perceptual states to ourselves and others every day, partly to make sense of our behavior. These can be considered personal-level representations, some of which we are often even conscious of. Beliefs can be directed at the world or can be about things that do not even exist. On the other hand, scientists regularly posit mental and neural representations in the brain and postulate that brain processes are about or stand in for things in the world. The Nobel Prize in Medicine was awarded twice for work in this area, to David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel in 1981 for their research on information processing in the brain, and in 2014 to Maybrit and Edvard Moser together with John O'Keefe for their discovery of place cells in the brain, considered a kind of neural GPS system that keeps track of the animal's location. These are just two examples for what may be called subpersonal neuronal representations. More recently, philosophers and scientists have started discussing the existence and nature of representations in artificial systems like Large Language Models (LLMs). Yet, these concepts of representations are still poorly understood and raise many questions. How should we think of these entities? What is their place in nature? Are they observable, or at least assessable and manipulable using the research methods available in the cognitive sciences? Can LLMs teach us anything about the nature of mental representations in humans? This research-oriented colloquium will be devoted to such questions and will take place entirely online on zoom as we will be reading and discussing very recent texts on the topic that represent the state-of-the-art of philosophical research on representations, which is not restricted to mental representations, but also involves neural representations and representations in artifical systems. The seminar sessions will involve talks by the philosophers and scientists themselves, and we expect students to join the session prepared with their questions to the authors, and thus having read the text carefully beforehand. This is a unique opportunity to engage with state-of-the-art research and we welcome all interested students. A background and some familiarity with Philosophy of Mind and/or Cognitive Science is resirable. Preparatory Reading: Krzysztof Dolega, Tobias Schlicht (2022) Mental Content. In: B. Young, C. D. Jennings (Eds.), Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience. A philosophical introduction. London: Routledge. (available in the accompanying Moodle Course)