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This course is taught en bloc. For dates and times, please see the entry on eCampus. Mental imagery refers to the generation and experience of perceptual representations in the absence of corresponding external stimuli, for example, visualizing an apple. A long history of positions in philosophy and psychology has assumed that mental imagery abilities are of great importance, if not necessary, for general cognitive functioning. However, the rapidly growing literature on aphantasia, namely the marked reduction or complete absence of mental imagery in at least one sensory modality, calls into question the importance attributed to imagery. Not only are people with aphantasia (currently estimated to make up roughly 4 percent of the general population) not gravely cognitively impaired, but they are also able to solve tasks that were previously used to test for imagery abilities.
How is this possible? And how, given that mental imagery is a private experience, can we be sure that people with aphantasia truly have deficient imagery?
In this block seminar, primarily conceptualized for philosophy and cognitive science students, we will address these and many other ongoing puzzles about mental imagery and aphantasia by employing an interdisciplinary approach. Together we will:
· Review historical debates and discuss seminal work in the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mental imagery.
· Dive into recent empirical findings and ongoing philosophical discussions about aphantasia.
· Discuss the broader implications that aphantasia research has for debates about consciousness and mental representation.
· Delineate future directions and potential pitfalls in investigating what has become one of the hottest topics in cognitive science and popular discourse.