Event Timeslots (1)
Wednesday
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The device you are reading this on would not have been possible without prior scientific theorizing. Like pretty much any other technological device, it is hence a clear success of science – as are weather forecasts, predictions of black holes and gravitational waves, or the anticipation of anthropogenic climate change. In the 1970s, philosopher Hilary Putnam thus called scientific realism 'the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle'. Scientific realism is a philosophical stance towards science, usually interpreted in terms of (i) the metaphysical commitment that there is, indeed, a mind-independent reality out there to be discovered, (ii) the semantic commitment that scientific theories, claims and hypotheses are capable of being literally true (i.e., not just metaphors that need interpretation, or prescriptions for doing something) and (iii) the epistemic claim that the best theories, claims and hypotheses are in fact at least approximately true of that mind-independent reality.
On the other hand, as Larry Laudan and others before him have pointed out, the history of science contains a load of then-successful but now-rejected theories. How can we reconcile this with the evident, spectacular successes of science, such as its enabling feats of engineering or allowing the prediction of hitherto unknown phenomena?
Selective scientific realism, which broadly says that only some parts of theories, claims or hypotheses need to be true to explain scientific success, provides an answer to this struggle. The seminar will discuss some classic forms of selective realism, classic approaches to developing and justifying it, as well as new vistas on its intricacies and problems. Students taking the course should be willing to engage with rigorous arguments and examples from the natural sciences. Detailed familiarity with e.g. mathematics or physics is not required.